Interview with William D. Miller

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WILLIAM D. MILLER

Interviewed by: G. Lewis Schmidt

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Q: This is Lew Schmidt interviewing Bill Miller at his home in Ponte Vedra, Florida on Saturday, the 4th of March, 1989. Bill, I'm going to ask you to start out by giving a brief background on what your origins were, what your education was, and then a little account of how it was that you came to get into the Information Program, that field of work. From there on we will take your particular assignments in sequence, and let you carry on from that point, although I will intervene from time to time with some questions. So why don't you start off with a brief bio sketch.

Bio-Sketch: William D. Miller

MILLER: I was born in Altoona, Pennsylvania. Before World War II I went to the University of Nebraska for one year, studied engineering, which I didn't particularly like but during the depression that seemed to be a good field to get into. Toward the end of World War II, I decided that engineering was not for me and thought I'd like to get into the diplomatic field. So I applied to Georgetown to go to school there. I went to the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, graduated in 1949.

First Government Service With CIA

While I was in school there, CIA recruited me for an administrative job which I took thinking that it (a) would help me get through school, the money came in handy, and (b) it might be helpful in getting into the foreign service when I graduated.

I stayed with CIA until 1962. Shortly after I graduated I turned from the administrative side into the professional side of the organization. I was sent to Cairo in 1955 and stayed there until 1958. During that period I met Tom Sorensen and we got to know each other fairly well. I might point out that Cairo was at that time in a crisis situation, as the Middle East almost always is. Nasser was at the height of his power and popularity. As Khomeini seems to capture the imagination of Muslims and some Arabs today, Nasser did at that time. And certainly he captured the imagination of the free world, especially the United States, Britain, France and Israel.

As a young officer there, I somehow or other managed to make some good connections in Egyptian government and in the periphery of the government—people who dealt very closely with Nasser. So I played an interesting role in the period of the Suez crisis, before and after. Tom was assigned to Egypt sometime after I'd been there. I got there in '55, I think he came in '57. And we got to know each other fairly well there. I also worked closely in my job with the USIS post there which was headed by Bill Weathersby. So I got to know both Tom and Bill, and a number of other people, including Burt McKee was Information Officer, and various others.

Transfer Into USIA, 1962

After I got back from Cairo, I was assigned to the Office of National Estimates where I worked for a little over a year. About that time I was beginning to look for something else. My aim from the beginning had been to get into the regular foreign service. After the Kennedy victory in 1960, Tom approached me and asked me if I would like to join USIA. I

told him yes. It took a little while to arrange this, but I believe it was in March of 1962 when I finally made the move. I entered USIA as Policy Officer in IAN. Then moved from that to Deputy Assistant Director and then Assistant Director within a matter of several years.

One little anecdote—you asked for anecdotes—Bill King was Assistant Director of USIA for Near East and South Asia (INA) when I joined the agency. One evening Bill came out to my house. It was a Friday evening. He said that he was going to see Murrow the next day, that Murrow had been pressing him to name a new PAO for Pakistan. And he asked me if I would like the job. Of course, I said yes.

I saw Bill the next evening at another affair somewhere, I've forgotten where, and asked him how his meeting with Murrow went. He said that he had proposed my name and that Murrow had said no, that he wanted King to go to Pakistan, something that Bill didn't particularly want to do at that point in his career. But he went and as a result, Bob Lincoln who was Deputy Assistant Director at that time was made Assistant Director, and I was moved up to Lincoln's job. I stayed in IAN until 1965 and then they assigned me to India to succeed Bill Weathersby as PAO.

Discussion of Problems and Objectives ofIAN During Miller's Assignments There

Q: Let me ask you, during the period that you were in the IAN area, were there any particular policies or goals that the IAN office was trying to get accomplished in the near eastern areas, any special crises that you had to handle? What were some of the things that you were concerned with while you were in the IAN shop?

Persuading Field Posts To Set AndOperate By Objectives

MILLER: Well, there were always crises. The Near East at that time was almost as critical as it is today. We were constantly having problems with various dissident groups attacking our libraries. I think the biggest problem we were having under Murrow, who was director at the time, was trying to get people to concentrate on specific objectives that we should

be aiming at and devote all our resources to them. And we still had a number of people who had been in the agency for a long period of time who felt that the U.S. Information Service was a service, and that the job was to service the customers and do whatever the people in whatever area they were serving wanted rather than pursue specific objectives of the agency. It was a transition period which lasted for some time, as you know. I think our biggest problem was to get that concept across, that we had limited resources and we had to use them as carefully as we possibly could. I hope and believe that we succeeded to some degree.

As far as specific objectives go, the area was so varied, running from Greece through India and Ceylon that the objectives varied also with particular parts of the area and even countries within particular parts. Egypt at that time was the most important country in the Arab world and it was hostile to the United States and our interests in the area.

Greek and Turkish Hostilities Over Cyprus

Greece and Turkey were at odds over Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios was in charge in Cyprus and the Turks were very suspicious of him and very protective of the Turkish minority on the Island. The Greeks, being suspicious of the Turks, feared forceful Turkish takeover of the Island. So we had problems trying to convince all three of these players that our objectives were commensurate with their own. The Arab world outside of Egypt was pretty fragmented. Our objective in most countries were to convince people there that the United States was a reliable leader of the free world and one that they should respect and pay attention to Then and now that was a very difficult thing to do.

India-Pakistan Hostilities

In the subcontinent, India and Pakistan were at each others throats, and for some period of time India and China were also at loggerheads or even at war. And we had the same sorts of problems in that area as in the Near East but the dimensions were quite different.

Q: The time that China attacked India was that while you were there or before you went out there?

MILLER: No, that was before. I think it was 1962.

Q: My memory gets hazy too when I try to remember just when these different things occurred.

Preserving Indian Experiment in Democracy

MILLER: The United States did come to India's aid for a period during that time and our prestige increased. But it wasn't a lasting thing in India.

They also had a tremendous problem in the subcontinent in particular tied to poverty, population growth, food supply, and that sort of thing. You may remember there were dire predictions of world famine at that time. The overriding U.S. objective at that time was to protect and preserve the Indian experiment in democracy. During the latter half of the Sixties the United States was pouring tremendous resources into India in an attempt to alleviate some of her more pressing problems, such as those listed above, without which democracy could not survive.

The primary USIS role was to alter Indian attitudes which might impede the tremendous effort being made by the United States and, to a lesser degree, other western governments to help India to cope with its massive problems. A lesser, but still important, USIS objective was to ensure that the tremendous and costly U.S. effort was understood within India.

Q: At the time you were in IAN and later in India, USIS had access to large amounts of —I guess they didn't call it Garicoa anymore—local currency at the disposal of the U.S. government.

MILLER: PL 480. Excess rupees. All through the '60s and into the '70s, the amount of PL 480 aid that we were giving to India was such that we were generating tremendous amounts of Indian currency owned by us. And it became apparent fairly early in the game that we were never going to use these currencies to any extensive degree, because to do so would absolutely bankrupt the economy of the country that we were trying to help. This was true not only in India but to a lesser extent in Pakistan and Ceylon and even Afghanistan. During my tenure in India this became a very important problem. It also provided us with some opportunities that any other USIS post in the world would love to have had. In other words, we had more money than we could spend so long as we could spend it in rupees.

Q: Were you paying the Indian employees out of that fund?

MILLER: Yes, and ourselves to the extent that we spent money in India.

PAO, India: 1965-1970

I was transferred to India in 1965 and stayed there for five years. And throughout that period I was constantly bombarded by Washington and visitors from Washington— visitors from the White House, Cabinet members, Congressmen, other important political figures. And they always wanted to see the PAO to find out how we could spend more of these Indian rupees.

Problems Caused and Successes Achieved ByGreat Availability of Surplus Rupee Funds

It was a crazy situation because the budget we received in Washington was in dollars. And so to the extent that we spent more money in India, it inflated the agency's budget even though what we were spending was blocked funds which could not be used in any other manner. And as you remember the Agency was having a very hard time getting a budget

of any kind out of Congress during that period. So we had to be careful on the one hand, but we had all kinds of pressures on the other hand to spend more.

All of the expenses of the Indian program with very few exceptions were paid in rupees, including our allowances, including the parts of our salary that we spent inside India and including a vast program that we had going out there.

Media Saturation in India

We printed all of our own publications in India and we had a number of publications that no other post could afford to have because of the rupee situation. We had, for example, the American Reporter, a weekly tabloid type newspaper. We printed about 500,000 copies in, as I recall, 14 languages. We had SPAN, a monthly magazine which we printed in the 100,000 copies and on which we spared almost no effort as far as quality went, to the extent that throughout the period of the '60s SPAN won the top national award in India as the best produced magazine in India. And I think at some point after I left there they disqualified SPAN from the competition in that because it was clear that they were going to continue to win it. We made our own movies. We had a large exhibit program—made all of our exhibits. We republished selected American books. In fact, we produced in India practically the entire media spectrum: print, electronic and visual. All of it paid for with blocked Indian rupees.

Q: Did you have your own motion picture studios, do the processing there too?

MILLER: Most of it in Bombay, yes. We used Indian studios for the processing.

Q: Who was your MOPIX officer at that time?

MILLER: Oh, gee. I forget. That's a terrible thing to say. But I'll think of it and fill it in at a later time. We had several. They were all very good.

Q: It wasn't Darryl Dance was it?

MILLER: Yes, Darryl Dance. He was the main—he was there through most of the period that I was there. He was very good. Allen Fisher was there for a time. At least one other. We made radio programs. Just about every form of communication we did locally.

Q: You say you produced radio programs too?

MILLER: Yes.

Q: Did you have any trouble getting those placed on Indian radio?

MILLER: Very little. Our relationships with All- India Radio were very good as were our relationships with practically all of the media in India. And I guess the thing was that India was so poor at that point that they were grasping for any information they could get. Communication in India was our biggest problem as it was for the government too. We did very little in the television field because we were—in a country of 500 million people in which there were only 5,000 television sets. And they were almost entirely in the hands of people who were experimenting with what future programming might be and that sort of thing. So television didn't really reach opinion makers to any great extent. So we did provide their television service with programming. But we did very little else in that field.

But radio was a big field. But even there in India with 565,000 villages, towns and villages, there were about that many (565,000) radio sets in the whole country. So you figure an average of one per village and when you consider that probably half of those sets or more than half were in the major cities, Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi and Madras, most of the villages didn't have any radio.

Themes and Objectives Stressed in India Programming

Q: What were the particular themes or objectives that you were stressing in your regular programming?

Development

MILLER: Development was one theme. There was some resistance as there always will be to the size of the American development effort, not on the part of the government but on the part of significant segments of the population. The communist party was quite substantial in India and leftist sentiments were fairly prevalent. The Soviets had a gigantic information cultural program. All of it trying to undercut the things that the United States was doing. So explaining the motives and the methods of our developmental effort were very important to us.

Promotion Of and Guidance Toward Democracy

Our second major objective was political— democracy. India at that time was the world's largest democracy. And we were the world's oldest. And we tried to keep drawing on that.

Foreign Investment Climate

A third was investment, foreign investment. The Indians were very fearful of the amount and types of foreign investments going into India. One counter to this we used was to show how the United States in its formative days had accepted and encouraged a great deal of foreign investment and it had not affected the freedom of action in any major way.

Q: Did your motion pictures follow much the same kind of thing? Were you stressing development?

MILLER: Yes, very much so.

Q: You weren't producing feature films I take it.

MILLER: No, no.

Q: Documentaries.

MILLER: Documentaries mainly on the AID program. We had incidentally our own AID information officer there. We had a labor information officer. We had a variety of luxuries in the field of information that other posts couldn't afford although the number and types were decreasing during the whole period I was there. As I mentioned, the pressure to get rid of rupees was countered by another pressure to cut the Agency's budget and this adversely affected our Indian program. When I went there we had 70 Americans and 535 local employees. Year by year we were called upon to make one ten percent cut after another. So that in five years we ended up with 38 Americans and probably about 400 Indians even though all of the Indians were paid nothing but rupees and were really costing the American taxpayer nothing. Incidentally, on that score our books program and several other programs actually were providing dollar income to the United States. We had a massive program for reprinting significant American books which we did and sold for rupees in India, sold for a very minimal cost. But they did use up rupees and the royalties for these books were paid in the United States in dollars. So a significant amount of dollars were repatriated in that fashion. There were some other dollars repatriated in other ways. For example, allowances which were budgeted in dollars were paid in rupees out there. So it cost nothing and the dollars were kept in the United States.

Cultural Center Operations Curtailed ByIndian Government Because of Soviet Violations

We had programs in all the major cities in India. We had branch posts in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and also a branch post for Northern India in New Delhi. And then we had a number of sub-posts which were really cultural centers in the smaller cities like Hyderabad, Bangalore, Trivandrum, Patna and Lucknow. And while I was there, however, the sub-posts came under fire because after they had been in place, India had passed

a law saying there could be no new cultural centers put in any cities that did not have a consulate.

And the Russians in violation of that law were building a gigantic cultural center in Trivandrum which collapsed, the building collapsed, before it was completed killing a number of workmen. This called attention to the fact that they were doing this in contravention of law. Mrs. Gandhi's reaction to that was to not only say the Soviets could not continue to build this, but that all of our centers had to be closed if they were not in an area that had a consulate. So we ended up closing six which had been in existence for some period of time. It was a very unfair thing because Russian information cultural effort was not limited or even primarily devoted to their specific Russian centers. They had more than 500 Indo-Russian cultural societies around the country which were completely dominated by the Soviets, and were operating outside the law.

USIS Effort—Success in PublicizingAID Programs in India

I think we did fairly well in India in explaining the AID effort. We were there during the period called the Green Revolution during which time the AID effort in the agricultural field was extremely successful. And I think the success was in part at least due to our efforts in publicizing what they were doing and in changing Indian attitudes toward more modern methods of agriculture.

Q: You had your AID information officers; they didn't have their own information officer on their staff?

MILLER: No, we handled their information.

Q: In some countries it was the other way around. They had their own information officers and sections.

MILLER: We handled it and I think they were very pleased with what we did. And the AID information effort survived, at least during my tenure there, all of the cuts that we had to make. The labor information program did not. The program remained but the American information officer did not.

Anti-American Attitudes Among Indian Upper Classes

Q: You mentioned earlier that there was a lot of antipathy towards the United States, not the government so much but among the populace. Or was it the other way around?

MILLER: Well, among parts of the populace. I would say by and large the entire populace was—well, if you took 90 percent of the Indian population was apathetic about any of this because they don't know anything about it. I mentioned the difficulties of getting information out. You're just not going to reach 90 percent of the population. Their main objective in life is survival. And they're apolitical really. Of the other ten percent I would say maybe one percent or one-tenth of that, ten percent of the ten percent, was anti-western, anti-American. And about probably half of the others had values similar to our own and were fairly sympathetic to things we were doing although almost all of them were suspicious of gigantic America and all of its resources. They didn't want us to bring overbearing influence on India. We did not.

Problems of Trying to Restrain NuclearProliferation in India

Q: Were you there at the time that India exploded its atomic device?

MILLER: No, that was after my—

Q: That was after your time.

MILLER: Yeah, there were indications when we were there that India was working on it. I'm glad you brought that up because that was a major problem. The efforts on our

part to limit nuclear proliferation were resented by most thinking Indians. Frank Moraes was one of India's top journalists at the time. Once in my home Joe Kraft the American columnist was visiting from the United States. I had Joe over to the house to meet with several Indian newsmen including Frank. They got onto the nuclear question and Frank Moraes who was a dove in everything you could imagine got very worked up about this in the course of the evening over quite a few drinks which he managed to imbibe at that period in his life. By nine o'clock in the evening he was just—

Q: Sloshed.

Indian Resentment Against U.S. Efforts toSuppress Nuclear Weapons Capability

MILLER: Yeah. But Frank became very upset about the fact that it was the white vest that was trying to impose a nuclear bomb moratorium on little brown brother. It was the first time that Frank had really gotten this idea, i.e., that India must build a nuclear device as a matter of national pride, across to me. I tested this proposition over and over again in subsequent conversations with others and found there was this sort of feeling throughout the country, not only on the bomb but on other things. They felt that we sort of were treating them as not quite up to our standards and so forth. It's something we hadn't—

Q: He must have been of Portuguese extraction, partly, at least.

MILLER: Yes, he was.

Q: His name, was it pure Portuguese or was it part Indian?

MILLER: Oh, he was Indian. He was Indian. But there was some Portuguese in his blood. He was of Goan extraction.

Q: Psychological.

MILLER: Not only that, in appearance and so on. He was living with an American woman, an American newspaper woman out there, a very fine person. He didn't get married to her. Frank was a Catholic. So that's the Portuguese influence. His wife had gone insane and she was still alive and being treated in some institution. But she was absolutely hopeless. But because she was alive he did not divorce and marry the American woman. He also has a son Dom Moraes. Frank is dead now. But Dom the last I hear was living in England married to an English woman and is a very fine writer on his own and a poet. It was really largely through a book that Dom wrote that I learned about Frank's wife and all the troubles that they had had. Let's see, do you want to lead me on to something? I'm rambling here.

Q: Well, that's all right.

USIS Publicizing of 1969 Moon Landing MILLER: Well, one thing we did manage to do somewhat towards the end of my stay there, in the last couple of years: we were able to convert some of the rupees into general resources for the agency program in the area. The PAO from Afghanistan came down at one point and said he was very hard put for any materials, particularly exhibit materials. And so we became a resource for him. By agreement with India on the use of these rupees we couldn't make things and export them. But we could if we made exhibits in India, once we were finished with them we could send them off so long as they eventually returned to India.

Q: I see. Another post could use them.

MILLER: Another post could use them. And so we after that, we were very conscious of the needs of Afghanistan and later Nepal. And then during the NASA moon landing, the subcontinent was pretty well left out of the direct participation because of the lack of television. They didn't see the moon landing there on television. We did bring it in on the Voice of America and rebroadcast the Voice signal such as it was. But we decided that in order to fill this void we would have a major exhibits program trying to show India just what

was happening. One of our Indian employees in the Exhibits section suggested that we make a full scale model of the lunar LEM.

Q: The Landing something—

MILLER: Module.

Q: Module.

MILLER: All right. Whatever it was. But the LEM. And we made—well, we tried and tried to get from NASA the dimensions and all that sort of thing. For some reason they wouldn't give them to us. We did have a model about five or six inches high that was billed as a —I think it was 1/49th scale. So our boys laboriously measured everything on that and multiplied by 49 and we built a model out of plywood. But it looked just like the real thing. And we put it up in the backyard of the USIS building there, Bahawalpur House which had very sizeable grounds around it. We attracted more than the million Indian visitors over a very short period of time including all the important Indians, the entire diplomatic corps there, which also, by the way, included the Soviet Ambassador who when he looked at it turned to me and said, is the real module that big? He couldn't believe that we had landed something that size on the moon. But we also had motion pictures showing various space feats that we put on pseudo television screens so that they could pretend that they were looking at space activity. Some of them really thought they were watching the real thing. But after we had that in New Delhi the other posts wanted it. So we built copies of it and sent it to major posts throughout India. Then there was a demand from other posts in the area and we ended up building quite a few copies of that and really somewhat in contravention of the spirit of the agreement, sending them to various places around the world. Several of the astronauts came to India after the landing. We have pictures of them climbing our plastic model. They were very impressed with this thing.

Q: They were?

MILLER: Yes.

Q: That was probably—I think Armstrong was one who came.

MILLER: Yeah.

Q: Because he also came to Thailand while I was there.

MILLER: I believe that's right, yeah.

Q: I've forgotten who the other two or three were. In Thailand quite an incident occurred because the leading television correspondent for the Thais who was sort of the Edward R. Murrow of Thailand had been devoting a great deal of his time to space activities. He was considered among the Thais the leading expert in the field other than the scientists. He tried to go up and approach Armstrong to ask a question, and the security people just elbowed him aside as if he were any old peon. He became completely disillusioned, and it cost us a lot of good will in Thailand. The security people just threw him aside. He never got a chance. Therefore, he said I'm not going to do anything about promoting this activity in Thailand. I'm not even going to cover the astronauts from this point on.

MILLER: Oh, for heavens sake.

Q: So we had a little trouble. Actually, we got a little footage in Thailand but most of it we covered ourselves. They wouldn't take it on the Thai TV.

MILLER: John Glenn was with us a couple of times. Did he come to Thailand?

Q: He didn't come while I was there. He may have before or later.

MILLER: He was in Burma at one point at some astronauts conference they had in Burma, and he stopped by India on the way home. We met him at the airport, my wife and I about, I guess it was seven o'clock in the evening, and he left New Delhi at roughly five the next

morning. And during the period of time he was there we had a press conference. We had him on the radio. We had several other interviews. And I've forgotten what else. But he was busy all of the time that he was there practically, very cooperative, very helpful. I finally took him out to the airport at about four o'clock in the morning. And we sat in this empty airport and he was wondering what he could get to take home to his wife. Everything was closed. The Indian people at the airport opened up all the shops and he went around buying presents for his wife. He had a great time. He was a very interesting and as I said cooperative fellow. He came back a couple of years later when he was Vice President of R.C. Cola. And he brought his wife with him this time. Once again they were very cooperative with our program.

Q: Are there any other things that you can think of about your Indian program?

MILLER: Well, there probably are quite a few, but offhand—

Q: If you think of any additional ones—

MILLER: Yeah, I will.

Q: —that come to mind after you get the transcription, you're perfectly free to add them at that time. And then did you go to Japan from there?

Return to Washington:Deputy Director, VOA: 1970-74

MILLER: No, I came back and became Deputy Director of Voice of America.

Q: When was that?

MILLER: 1970 to 1974. And that was a period when we were trying to expand the Voice to get a signal, an acceptable signal to—well, a large part of the earth where it wasn't coming in. In India, for example, the Soviet signal came in loud and strong and could be heard everywhere, and the VOA signal was very weak. Through large parts of India it was almost

so weak that it couldn't be heard. Even so, we did have a sizeable audience in India. And I mentioned how few radios there were. And in the early days of radio in India, the British had emphasized short wave radio as the means of choice for reaching as much of India as possible because of this vast areas there.

Short wave radio in India was at least as common as medium wave radio. Actually, I believe it was more common. I think almost all of the radios were equipped for short wave at that time. And short wave listening was the common thing to do. Short wave listening, as you know, is more difficult than medium wave. But the Indians were accustomed to this. So the squeaky signal didn't bother them all that much. So we did have a sizeable listening audience in India. All the surveys that we were able to make, and you could make surveys in India with no government interference so that it was possible to get fairly reliable surveys done, showed that VOA had more listenership than Soviet radio even though the strength of signal was not comparable at all.

Q: That's interesting. I read about all the sympathies of the Indians being directed more towards the Soviets than they were towards us.

MILLER: Well, at that time the Soviet radio was strong, but their programming was not very good. The content was so argumentative and polemic that even Indians, unless they were dedicated communists, were skeptical. I felt that the only people who really listened to the Soviet radio in India were people who were already convinced pro-Soviets or pro-Communists. The others listened to us. They listened to BBC far more than us of course. BBC had a much better signal and a long tradition behind it.

Q: What transmitter were you relying on to get the message from the Voice into India?

MILLER: I believe we were getting it out of North Africa mainly, although the Philippines did come into Eastern India.

Q: I think I recall that the transmitter we put up in Thailand was primarily a medium wave one, wasn't it?

MILLER: Yes.

Q: Designed to get into the areas immediately around there.

MILLER: You could pick up the Thai medium wave in the Calcutta area during certain times of the day.

Q: Did you transmit any messages, any broadcasts into India through the Thai transmitter?

MILLER: No. It was not targeted to the subcontinent. But the worldwide English, of course, which was the language that most Indians listened to anyway on short wave, that is on foreign radios, could be heard and so it was helpful. I remember picking it up on a car radio in Calcutta several times even though other people down there had told me they couldn't get VOA. I pointed out that I had it on the car radio. But that signal was unreliable and it was only at certain times of the evening that you could get it.

Back to the VOA thing. Ken Giddens who was the Director of VOA at that time, was determined that he wanted to increase the signal worldwide. And I think that it can be said that his major effort when he was Director was directed at trying to get a better climate in the Congress for additional facilities and better plans on our part for what we needed and what we might need far into the future. I'm not quite sure what happened after I left there. But I'm under the impression that most of those plans really did go forward, although not too many of them during the time that I was there. There was also concentration on trying to redirect the signal where possible to areas that were not well covered, and to emphasize those areas where we needed a better VOA signal.

VOA Difficulties in SecuringAdequate Funds From Congress

While I was in VOA that was one major problem. Another major problem was one of funds. We were still under the gun of reducing funds for the agency as a whole. The Voice was a major consumer agency of funds, particularly dollars. And we were having considerable problems with a large portion of Congress and in particular Senator Fulbright on the Foreign Relations Committee, who in my opinion, didn't really believe in the Voice or perhaps—

Q: Fulbright didn't believe in anything that he considered "propaganda."

MILLER: That's really it, yeah. The Fulbright program was about the extent of his belief in any kind of—

Q: He's still playing the same tune even now.

MILLER: Is he really?

Q: Yes.

MILLER: Well, they had massive cuts that they were recommending in the Voice budget. And we spent an inordinate amount of effort in trying to defend the budget and counter those plans. Fortunately, I think in the United States public opinion to the extent that it exists at all about USIA was more favorable to the Voice than any other part of the program.

Q: They knew about that. They didn't know about anything else.

MILLER: Yeah. And I know that in one effort, I've forgotten what year it was. It was probably 1973. The Fulbright committee was proposing a cut in our budget which would have emasculated the Voice.

The cut was so extreme that we would have had to cut languages. We were broadcasting at that time in 36 languages plus English I believe. And if my memory serves me right, we

would have had to cut to somewhere around 20 or 21 languages. And I at one point asked somebody to research for me what other international broadcasters were broadcasting in how many languages and how many hours per week and that sort of thing and look to see where we would be on the scale of major international broadcasters if that were to take place. And it turned out that we would be just between Portugal and Albania. And somehow or other the word of that got out into the press and—

Q: It couldn't possibly have been leaked by anybody in VOA.

MILLER: Nobody that I know of. And it was picked up and played over and over again. What kind of a voice do we want? One that is equal to Portugal and Albania. And that effort was effectively countered largely I think because of that. Although of course there were a lot of people in Congress who did believe in the Voice. The Voice has more support in Congress than the other elements of the Agency. It's easier to understand than the idea of a carefully targeted program which the rest of the Agency must follow. It's very difficult for a politician to understand the careful targeting that the rest of USIA must practice. I remember talking with one Senator, I've forgotten who now and the name may come to me, when I was in India explaining to him that even though we were spending these vast resources we had to limit our targeting to approximately the upper tenth of one percent of Indians. And he said “in my programming I try to reach everybody. Nobody is too small for me to ignore.” So that's the difference. Obviously, I think the agency if it had the resources should try to reach everybody. But there's no way in the world that—

Q: Well, a lot of them don't have radios to be reached.

MILLER: (a) you can't reach them and (b) think of what a vast effort it would take to reach everybody in the world.

Q: There are 4.5 billion or more people.

MILLER: At any rate, the Voice does have a different approach to information dissemination and cultural dissemination than the rest of the Agency and it has to by the nature of the medium. There's no way that you can select your audience for the Voice other than by the content of what you broadcast. And I think the voice is doing and should do that. I mean, they should broadcast to reach the opinion leaders. But the audience is self selecting in a way that we can't control—we don't have anybody sitting in front of us that we're talking to. The audience doesn't tune in by written invitation. We don't have anybody we're delivering a newspaper to or anybody we're inviting to a cultural program of one sort or another. We have somebody who turns a dial and picks us up. And he listens to us if he wants to. So there's no selection process other than the content of the program that you're putting out. Plus the fact there is a natural selection in that the more curious people and the more affluent people and the more successful people, tend to (a) have short wave radios, and (b) have the curiosity to try to operate them.

Miller's View of Degree to Which Policy Guidance(USIA and State) Interferes with VOA Broadcasting

Q: I'd like to ask you another question because one of the problems that the Voice is always complaining about is that they're getting so much interference (a) from the State Department and (b) from the policy directors of USIA that it interferes on many occasions with the kind of broadcasting they want to do. Now, I remember that when Tom Sorensen was Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, there was quite a number of times when he was trying to insist that the Voice cut back on some of the critical developments of news in the United States and only put forward those that were favorable. This was during the Kennedy Administration here. You had nothing to do with the Voice at that point, but how did you feel about whatever was being done by the policy people both at State and USIA at the time that you were the Deputy Director?

MILLER: Well, I felt that we did have a lot of misunderstanding of what the Voice could do and what it couldn't do. And I think that's natural. But I didn't find that any of it was

unmanageable. I think at the time I was there was one of the more critical times of the Voice because the Watergate thing was breaking wide open. And I was there during the whole Watergate period. That was a period when we had the official U.S. radio talking about the President of the United States in terms that were not exactly flattering, just by reporting the news. And I constantly received calls from—well, mainly from the policy staff, Ken Towery for one called me frequently looking at something that had been called to his attention I'm sure from our last night's broadcast. And he'd say, “Bill, do you really have to say that?” And the obvious answer was, “well, Ken. If we don't say it do you think they're not going to find out about it?” And he would think about it for a little while and say, “well, I guess you're right.” He never really went any further than that. Some of the others I got calls not so much from State although I did once or twice get calls, not once or twice. I got calls few times from State objecting to certain things that we'd said. And sometimes they were right. The problem I think with the Voice as it was then, I'm not going to say how it is now because I don't know, is that the people running the news and feature operation were by and large people who had never served overseas.

Q: That's right.

MILLER: And while they tried to tailor their product to their audience, to the understanding of their audience, they never really had quite that feel for it that they would have if they had lived overseas for a period of time. And so there is a tendency I think on the part of people like that, natural tendency, to write and deliver your broadcast as though you're talking to somebody in Kansas instead of somebody in Hyderabad who has absolutely no—the man on the other end of the line by and large has no real concept of the United States or of the whole climate in which the events you are talking about took place. So you have to balance one against the other. And there is no way that we could get by without telling the truth. There is no way that you can broadcast one thing to one country and another to another country. You can't stop that radio signal on the national border. And there's no way that you can ignore something that is of importance and maintain your credibility. And I think throughout the Watergate thing we did maintain, I think we enhanced the credibility

of the Voice. We were constantly being investigated by U.S. news organizations who were, at the beginning at least, convinced that we were tailoring or twisting our broadcasts. Ken Giddens and I began to count the number of investigations that we'd had about VOA handling of Watergate. And we stopped counting at 25. And every time we came out okay. Nobody could find real fault with our broadcasting. On the other side, we did have people who were in the administration who cringed when they picked up something that the official voice of the United States was saying about our president.

Question: Should VOA Be a CompletelyIndependent Entity?

Q: The other big question on the Voice, as you well know, there are quite a few people within the Voice who feel that they ought to be independent of not only USIA but ought to be independent of any agency. They should be a separate entity. From your four years on the Voice how do you feel in that regard?

MILLER: Well, I feel that the Voice needs to have policy constraints. I think that the Voice needs the input of the policy apparatus. I think that sometimes that input can be a little too heavy handed. But whether or not it ought to be inside the Agency or out I don't really have that much feeling about. I think it's operating pretty well within the Agency. So for that reason I don't see any real need to change it. I think you'll always have in the Voice that irritation with the constraints that are placed upon them.

Q: And always will.

MILLER: And it's probably healthy that you do, you have the argumentation back and forth about how far they should be going and what they should be doing. But I don't really see any reason for having an officially sponsored radio unless it is doing something to further the interest of the United States. Now, telling the truth I think does further the interests of the United States, showing the diversity of the United States furthers the interest of the United States. I don't mean that we should slavishly follow every little change in the U.S. line on everything. I think everybody points to the BBC as being the most successful of

the international radio broadcasters. And I think they do that, i.e. further long-range British interest. There's no question in my mind that the external service of the BBC operates within certain limitations.

Q: I'm sure.

MILLER: Policy. And they manage to keep their credibility. And I think the Voice manages to keep its credibility. I think VOA's credibility over the years has improved greatly.

Q: I think it has. There is, of course, now a new and probably the most dangerous effort to break up the agency that's ever come along. And one of the proposals is to make the Voice independent, give the information part of it back to the State Department and possibly to—they don't know what they want to do with the cultural and international exchange program. But one of the suggestions which seems pretty ridiculous is to give it to the Smithsonian to operate.

MILLER: Well, I would be totally against it. I think that the agency must concentrate on an effective information program. And I don't think that by placing it under the State Department, the information side under the State Department, the cultural side, wherever, and the Voice a third place is going to do that. I think the Agency has come a long way in developing its theories and plans and raison d'etre. And I think it would be a great step backward. As a matter of fact, I'm not at all sure if you're going to do that you shouldn't just get rid of the information program except for press attach#s.

Q: I agree. Peter Galbraith, son of John Kenneth, is the one who is pressing this very extensively. He's not the head of the foreign relations committee staff in the Senate but he has a prominent position. He has captured the sympathy of Claiborne Pell who is Chairman of the Committee. And they've been trying to introduce legislation along those lines. I don't think they've got it introduced yet. But it is a real danger that they'll try at this session of Congress.

MILLER: That seems to be a real contradiction. Because I was under the impression that the Agency had finally become an established accepted—

Q: I did too.

MILLER: I can't see and I've never believed in separating the cultural and the informational aspects of it.

Q: Neither do I.

MILLER: I don't see how you can separate them. The cultural program is informational

Q: Well, of course it is.

MILLER: And the information program is cultural.

Q: And what do you send a person abroad for as an exchangee whether he comes to the United States or whether he's an American going the other direction? You send him to get a message across in one way or the other. And he's doing it, if it's not the hardest sell, he's doing it in support of the same kind of thing that the informational and radio activities are trying to do. It's ridiculous. But nevertheless, people with Fulbright's help seem to think that there's something completely separate and pristine pure.

MILLER: I know that. I know that.

Q: And they'll try to get some of these activities curtailed with the support of some of these Fulbright extremists.

MILLER: Well, I think they don't understand what an information program is. I for one am not—I don't believe in calling it a propaganda program because of the connotation attached to propaganda. I think information fits very well. But I think that there is a large body of people in the educational and political spheres in the United States who look upon

an informational program as essentially a heavy handed propagation program. Maybe we could get on to my Japanese experience. I think that is an illustration of how the cultural program and information program mesh well together.

Q: Well, if you think you've covered everything you want to say about—

MILLER: I'm sure I haven't. But I know that I had something that I wanted to say but it slipped my mind for the moment. Maybe I'll get back to it.

Q: Well, if it occurs to you before we get through with the interview, you can go back. And we can always change the location of it in the final transcripts. So in that case, therefore, why don't we pass on to your activities as Director of USIS in Japan.

The PAO Japan Experience: 1974-77

MILLER: All right. Now, Japan is almost the opposite of India as far as its general communications, as well as for the type of programs one should have there. First of all, Japan has practically the same amount of media exposure as the United States does. In some areas perhaps more. And it has roughly the same level of sophistication. You've got a highly educated audience.

Q: Ninety-eight percent literate.

MILLER: Ninety-eight percent literate if you can believe that given the difficulties of the Japanese language. It's a great accomplishment.

Japan's Media Saturation and SophisticationRequire Special USIS Procedures to Assure Success

Q: It is.

MILLER: And so the idea of issuing press releases, of putting out your own materials and having them used is ridiculous. The Japanese media are so capable of gathering information on their own that they have no need for this at all. And they recognize a handout for what it is, a handout. So the question is how do you crack a market like Japan? And the answer to that is you find out what it is that we want to say to them, what they are interested in hearing about from us. And you say it to them in a way that they'll accept it. And the best way, the easiest way to do that, is through various exchange programs. We—now, this was not my doing. This was done well before I got there. But I think at that time Japan had the most sophisticated program in the world, exchange program, in that we invited people from the United States to come to Japan, usually two or three at a time, to meet with Japanese counterparts in the same field and discuss their respective subject specialties. And we had to get people of sufficient importance that they would be important for the Japanese media to cover. If you could get the Japanese media to cover them then you'd have all of Japan at your feet reading your information.

That basically is what the Japanese program was all about when I was there. You had to use a variety of weapons. Some of them were sending Japanese to the United States to cover things. But normally the Japanese would do that. But maybe your information officer talking to somebody at NHK might suggest why don't you send somebody over to cover this or that? And quite often the Japanese were very willing to do that. Personal contact in Japan was very important. We had to work very hard to keep our contacts with the various media and the academic and cultural sections of Japan. And through that personal contact we were able to get on to the Japanese media frequently. And frequently we got across a good solid message. It could be a hard hitting message. If it comes from an important American official visiting Japan, he can say what he wants to and they will print and broadcast it, televise it. And we had very good access to NHK, the Japanese national television service and the other television companies and practically all of the major press. Not for hand outs but for things which we could develop. And we also did have a sufficient number of important Americans visiting there, mostly on their own. Our

program merely rounded out the elements that we could scrounge up from people who were coming through on their own. If they listened to only one particular segment of America, for example, businessmen, then they'd get an imbalance.

But one thing that comes to mind was the Law of the Seas Conference that took place while I was in Japan. The Japanese were very interested in this, especially the idea of putting a 300 mile limit or 50 mile limit or whatever out there, as they saw it, to obstruct their fishing which was a lifeblood question in Japan. Fish constitutes a very large part of the Japanese diet. Their fishing industry is quite large, and they were very concerned about limiting catches of whales for example. We in this country were very disturbed about those Japanese killing all the whales. The Japanese were concerned about us keeping them from eating whale meat which they like.

We saw that that was going to be a problem very early in the game. And we began to invite Americans who were interested, who were involved, in the Law of the Sea and particularly the fisheries thing, to Japan and have them state their case outright and state it in as hard hitting terms as they wanted. I think by and large we blunted the Japanese opposition to the law of the sea by doing this. They began to understand what the real problem it was and why large parts of the rest of the world were so concerned about it. So they understood that while they might be eating a little less whale meat, this had to be done or they wouldn't be eating any at all sometime in the not too distant future.

Q: I wanted o ask you another question. Did you immediately succeed Al Carter?

MILLER: Yes.

Evaluation of Program Techniques Instigatedby Al Carter in USIS Programming

Q: What was your evaluation of the very substantial change that he made in the Japanese program?

MILLER: I thought his basic changes were good. But I thought it had gone too far. We were too exclusive. Naturally the cost of doing business in Japan was so great that we had to be very limited in our targeting, very, very limited. But I felt that we had to be limited in our targeting without appearing to be. So we didn't have to go around telling everybody that we don't want you in our cultural centers. And there was a general sort of attitude of that kind in the American staff there. My mandate at that time was to make changes in the program because it had offended a number of people who had gone out there to look it over.

Q: It offended quite a number of prominent Japanese too I think.

MILLER: Oh, but I think that was the biggest problem. We practically told people at the doors of our library—this is an exaggeration-but they couldn't come in unless they were on this particular list. And so we had to put a stop to that and we did. And I think I was resented by a good bit of the American staff there for insisting on that.

Q: Were they still using those—oh, it was I guess a form of the computerization. They had these TV-like monitors in each of the centers and they were virtually eliminating the books at one point. You had to get your information from the center by going through this monitor system in which you had a monitor screen.

MILLER: There was an awful lot of that. And it was more than that. It was a slavery to technology to the extent that you almost eliminated the human element.

Q: Yeah.

MILLER: And we had to humanize the program more. That was the biggest problem. There were also, I felt, we seemed to go overboard on things like paint, you know, being extremely modern in designing our libraries and so forth. I thought we should be up to

date. But I didn't think in a contest with the Japanese we were going to win any prizes for leading the world, not USIA at any rate with the limited budget we had.

Q: The Japanese have great pride in their own particular decorative capabilities.

MILLER: Exactly, exactly. And so I thought our facilities ought to be modern, neat, clean, but warm. We found things like an insistence on the part of some of our people that even that the glasses we used to serve cocktails had to be the finest quality glasses that you could find. And my administrative guy found at one point that they were spending something like four or five dollars per glass which tend to get broken fairly frequently too. And we put a stop to that kind of thing over considerable opposition.

But no, the program needed to be humanized. That was the biggest thing. I think basically Carter had the right idea, that you had to cut out the hand outs sort of thing and stick to what you were trying to do. But they have a tendency to carry things a little bit to extremes. I hope within my stay there we managed to do that— humanize.

Flashback to Certain TechnologicalInnovations Attempted in India

To get back to the Indian program, I just happened to think when we were talking technology. A couple of my failures in India were in the field of technology. Before I went out there I was fairly familiar with the program. One thing that struck me was the amount of waste that we were experiencing with a lot of our mailouts; either they were not getting to the target we intended or in some cases recipients were getting multiple copies and things like that.

So I decided that we would computerize the system. We're talking about the technology of the mid-'60s and we were below that. But the idea was to put on IBM cards all of our target audience and in the process to go through the target audience very carefully and make sure that we had the right people and so forth. That part I think was fairly successful

in defining our audience and in selection we did fairly well. But in the five years I was there we never got a computerized mailing system to work all that successfully.

We did some big things. Partly we revolutionized the Indian ministry of postal telegraphs. Because we started bulk mailing, pre-sorted by us and all that sort of thing that they'd never had. And we were able to get considerable cooperation from them on this. But the first time through with the IBM cards the errors in punching the cards ran up to 15 or 20 percent. The Indian Postal Service copies many of our innovations

Q: Quite frequently very inaccurately.

MILLER: So we had quite a time with that. Then another thing I tried to do was I wanted to be more personal in dealing with people. But you're still talking about such large numbers of people it's difficult for me to sit down and hand write a letter to each of the top ten percent of the target audience or something like that. And I thought about these automatic typing machines, the predecessors of word processors where you had one master machine and a bunch of slaves that could type an individually typed letter to a fair number of people, still a small number compared to hat we're doing.

So we sent back to Washington and got them to send us this setup. We had about I think 20 slave typewriters and one master. And we got it all ready to go and nobody ever figured out how to operate it. We never did get it operating. We asked for help from Washington. We never got it. So it was just a fiasco. We really wasted the—

Q: I don't know if they ever did anything with that or not. I, of course, left the program in '72. I don't know what happened after that.

MILLER: In line with that though I got a letter one day. We did manage to tailor some of our things a little more personally than that. But I got a letter from the President of India saying, Dear Mr. Miller, a personal letter saying that he was very sorry that he could not attend some program that we were having. And I called for who was responsible—I don't

remember writing him a letter inviting him to this. So they searched the files and they found his in the file of the target audience. And the letter that was sent to him began, “Dear Friend.” Here we're writing the President of India. But they were so unsophisticated I guess he thought I really personally wrote him. So I put a stop to mass mailings of that sort. But that kind of thing does creep in. Now, where are we?

Back to Discussions on Japan

Q: Well, you went back to India because you forgot one thing you had wanted to mention. But you left Japan. I don't know if you had more to say about Japan or not.

MILLER: Well, I think basically that pretty well covers it. I think our program in Japan was quite successful. But it was mainly due, I think, to personal contact. I think the ability to—if someone was coming through to be able to call up NHK and say, look, so and so from the U.S. is coming—.

Q: Do you have an interest in being a recipient of his message or expertise?

MILLER: Yeah, I remember one. Alex Haley came up to visit over—it was either Christmas or New Years. I believe it was Christmas. But at any rate, Japan not being a Christian country celebrates Christmas anyway.

Q: I was over there this year just before Christmas.

MILLER: Were there Christmas things in the stores?

Q: You'd think you were in the United States. Huge Christmas trees in all the stores and carols being sung.

MILLER: First time I visited Japan back in—must have been in the early '60s or late—no, it was in the late '50s, that struck me. It happened to be Christmas time and I went down to the Ginza and there were all the stores with all the lights and everything.

Well, at any rate some of the people in the Embassy said that, well, Alex Haley's coming in, but you won't be able to do anything with him. I said, baloney. We called NHK and we had him on NHK for an hour. And all of the newspapers covered him. We had worldwide coverage of him.

Q: If you have a great personality, one of international recognition, you have no trouble with the Japanese.

MILLER: That was one thing we were always getting. That's one thing about the program, a lot of the resources of the program are resources of opportunity. But I think that the personal contact was the main thing that ought to be emphasized in Japan because with that, if that's established then you can do almost anything you want to. That's got to be true of the rest of the developed world too.

Short Assignment at the Pentagon

Q: Yeah, I think it's true over the more sophisticated countries. What did you do after Japan?

MILLER: Well, after Japan I really—I was assigned to the Pentagon as the Agency's liaison officer. And it wasn't my cup of tea. The job—what's the name of the Pentagon's foreign service thing, their sort of State Department. I forget what it's called now. ISA (International Security Agency).

Q: Oh, yeah. They have an assistant secretary for international affairs or something like that.

MILLER: Yeah, that's where I was assigned. In this particular case I thought the person in charge was unsure herself—it was a woman at this point. And she was just trying her wings in the job. And they didn't know what to do with me. The Public Affairs Officer at the Pentagon was a friend of mine from Japan. So the only thing I did there that was

productive at all was help him out on some things. And I'd been there just a short while and I went in to see the agency and told them that I didn't think I was being utilized there and I wanted to get out. And they asked me what they should do with the job. And I said I think you should abolish it. So they did. I know we have some kind of liaison over there now, but I don't know just what it is.

Q: Yeah, and I don't know just who it is now.

Two Years—1977-79—With the Board of Examiners

MILLER: But this job wasn't—we were wasting a man over there. And especially with all the demands on the Agency for cutting here and cutting there, that was one job that could be abolished with no trouble. So then I went with the Board of Examiners and stayed there until I retired.

Q: When was it you retired?

MILLER: '79, January of '79.

Q: So you were in Japan until when?

MILLER: '77.

Q: '77.

MILLER: The latter part of '77. Then I was in the Pentagon about six months I guess and the rest of the time with the Board of Examiners which I enjoyed but I wouldn't want to make my career with the Board of Examiners.

Q: Well, I guess that you've covered everything that you're thinking of right now. But as we said before, whenever you get the transcript, read it, add or subtract anything that you

want to add or take out that you had said before. I just want to end up by thanking you very much for—

Some Additional Recollections Relating to VOAand an Early Experience with Ed Murrow

MILLER: I thought of something. The VOA. You mentioned that at one point about Tom Sorensen back in the '50s or '60s rather they were talking about the Voice ought to do this or that. Under Kehoe, Kehoe had the view that Voice should not be involved in all-[End of Tape 1, Side 2]

Q: Just as we finished the last tape, you had come in with more thoughts—going back to something connected with the Voice.

MILLER: Yes, Jim Kehoe who was Director of the Agency at the time of the Watergate thing, I think was very uncomfortable with the output of the Voice on a number of things which overall gave, I believe, a favorable impression of the United States, but had certain elements in them that were not quite so favorable. And he formulated in his own mind at least an idea that he thought would take care of the problem. He asked Ken Giddens and myself to have lunch with him one day. And in the course of the discussion about the Voice he suggested that we work out a new approach to programming. He said that the one magazine in the world that is the most popular everywhere is the world is the Reader's Digest. And the Reader's Digest is popular because it is filled with upbeat material. And he would like the Voice to be—or at least he would like our opinion about making the Voice the Reader's Digest of the air. Ken and I were somewhat stunned by this. And we spent several hours that afternoon rebutting the thing. But I don't think we ever convinced Kehoe that he wasn't right.

And we left on sort of acrimonious terms. The thing never was resolved. And, of course, the Voice never was made the Reader's Digest of the air thank God. One argument that we used was one I mentioned earlier about India where the Soviets with the very strong signal and everything, had a message that people didn't want to hear. Therefore, all the

money was wasted. And I for one said that if they felt the voice was doing that much damage to the United States in the way it was operating, the best thing to do would be to close it down.

Q: I'm surprised that Kehoe with his long period at Time Magazine would have taken that attitude.

MILLER: We were surprised too.

Q: It seems very strange.

MILLER: Gene Kopp was at that meeting too.

Q: What was Kopp's attitude?

MILLER: Well, he just supported Kehoe. e didn't seem to do it with any great degree of enthusiasm. But we asked Kopp later if Kehoe was serious about it. And he said, oh, yes. He's deadly serious.

Q: Is that it?

MILLER: That's it. Oh, I had one more other little vignette.

Q: Oh, all right. Well, why don't you throw that in. Because we've got lots of space on this tape.

MILLER: All right. This is to jump back to the early days of the—my days with the Agency when Murrow was still the Director. And I had recently joined the Agency. One day I was called to a meeting in Murrow's office. And there were several other people there. I've forgotten now who they were. But it turned out that each of us had been recently recruited from different agencies of the U.S. government.

Murrow began the meeting by saying “this meeting never happened.” Then he went on to say that he had called us together because we had been in different agencies and we knew our way around in those agencies. And we knew people, who the good guys were and who the bad guys were. And he said, the agency is desperately in need of some new blood. And he said that he would like for us to proselyte from these other agencies. When you find a good person just try to find out if he's interested in us and if he is get him. And then he adjourned the meeting saying this meeting never happened.

Well, I walked out of the meeting and I began thinking about it. And not too long after I ran into a young woman who worked for CIA. I had been impressed by her when I was with the Board of National Estimates where she was called upon to give a presentation on, I believe, it was Afghanistan. But I could be wrong. And she was a very smart woman and knew a great deal about her subject—seemed to have her head screwed on right. So I saw her somewhere and I asked her if she would be interested in joining USIA. She was very interested. So I started the ball rolling to recruit her for the agency. And a little while later as this recruitment was progressing, I was called back into Murrow's office. He asked me if I was trying to recruit this girl. Are you trying to recruit her from CIA? I said, yes sir. And he said, “Goddamn it Miller. You're not allowed to proselytize. Now you cut that out right now.” I left the meeting, I left his office completely baffled.

Q: I thought you were going to say that he said we can't have a previously active person in CIA in the operation.

MILLER: Well, it was almost the same thing. I learned that the CIA security had found out that I was the guy after her. So he nailed me. The other thing though is that about a year after that this woman married Jim Carrigan who was in the Agency.

Q: Oh, yeah. Very active.

MILLER: Very, yeah.

Q: Jim was with us.

MILLER: That's right. Out in Thailand, sure.

Q: Mary was the Special Assistant to the CIA representative. Well, he wasn't actually. He was the coordinator of a counter insurgency effort. But he was a CIA man out there doing that. Pierre—I can't think of his last name.

MILLER: No, no. I can't think of it.

Q: Not Pierre Ackstrom, Pierre—

MILLER: Oh, I know who that is. Pierre—oh, the name will come to me. But I know that. Well, that was my one and only attempt to recruit anybody.

Q: Well, she ended up marrying somebody from USIA anyway. So that's the other side of the coin. Again Bill, thank you very much. And as I say, you can add anything or deduct anything from the interview when you get the transcript.

End of interview